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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to identify and
describe some of the human factor problems which
can occur in the cockpit of a modern civilian
helicopter. After examining specific hardware and
software problems in the cockpit design of the
Eurocopter (Aerospatiale) AS332L-1 Super Puma,
the author proposes several principles that can be
used to avoid similar human factors problems in the
design of future cockpits. These principles relate to
the use and function of warning lights, the design of
autopilots in two-pilot aircraft, and the labeling of
switches and warning lights, specifically with
respect to abbreviations and translations from
languages other than English. In the final section
of the paper, the author describes current trends in
society which he suggests should be taken into
consideration when designing future aircraft
cockpits.
NOMENCLATURE
ADF
ADI
CDI
DECCA
DME
EFIS
FFCL
HSI
IFR
ILS
LORAN
MGB
NG
NR
T4
VLF/OMEGA
VOR
Automatic Direction Finder
Attitude Deviation Indicator
Course Direction Indicator
Area Navigation System
Distance Measuring Equipment
Electronic Flight Info. System
Fuel How Control Lever
Heading Situation Indicator
Instrument Flight Rules
Instrument Landing System
Area Navigation System
Main Gear Box
Gas Generator Speed
Rotor Speed
Engine Exhaust Gas Temp.
Area Navigation System
VHF Omnidirectional Receiver
INTRODUCTION
The Eurocopter (Aerospatiale) AS332L-1
Super Puma is a twin-engine commercial helicopter,
primarily designed for passenger transport. It is a
derivative of the SA 330 Puma which was
developed initially to meet a French Air Force
requirement for a medium-sized helicopter able to
operate day or night in all weather and in all
climates. Although used very little in the United
States, the Super Puma is popular in many parts of
the world and has been particularly successful in
offshore oil market in the North Sea. The AS332L-
1 is equipped with Turbomeca Makila 1A1 engines,
can carry up to 24 passengers, has a maximum gross
weight of 18,960 pounds, and has a maximum cruise
speed of 150 knots.
The author flew and instructed in Super
Pumas for Helikopter Service A/S of Norway, a
North Sea offshore operator, and Trump Air of
New Jersey, a FAR Part 135 operator. The
information contained in this report comes from
over five years and 2000 hours of flying experience
in the Super Puma and from over 600 hours of
instruction and observation of other experienced
professional pilots in a six-axis AS332L-1
Rediffusion simulator owned by Helikopter
Service.
It is the author's contention that the
optimum cockpit design for any aircraft will not be
found by the manufacturer alone. Line pilots and
instructors can and should help manufacturers
decrease the incidence of human factor errors by
providing enlightened feedback about ergonomic
problems encountered in the cockpit.
Presented at the Fifteenth European Rotorcraft
Forum, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1989.
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THE SHELL MODEL
The SHELL Model (Fig. 1) is one conceptual
model of human factors. In the center of the model,
is the human operator, or LIVEWARE. When
working with a machine, the operator must contend
with SOFTWARE, HARDWARE, the
ENVIRONMENT, and other LIVEWARE. A
mismatch anywhere in the system causes stress,
which decreases efficiency and safety.
SOFTWARE
HARDWARE
ENVIRONMENT
LIVEWARE
L I VEWARE
FIGURE 1. The SHELL model of human factors.
HARDWARE relates to the machine itself and,
with respect to aircraft, includes such things as
controls, displays, warning systems, safety
equipment, seat design, and cabin facilities.
SOFTWARE, again in relation to aircraft, includes
operating procedures, format of manuals, checklist
design, language of information, graphs/tabulation
design, and symbology.
ENVIRONMENT includes temperature, noise,
vibration, humidity, pressure, light, pollution, and
circadian/biorhythmic cycles.
LWEWARE includes personal relations, crew
coordination, discipline, communications, and
leadership. 1
The main concerns of this paper are with
the hardware and software portions of the SHELL
model. Although there is room for improvement of
environmental factors in many aircraft and
particularly helicopters, problems with these
factors are generally well-known. Liveware
factors, i.e. the human-to-human interactions, are
usually outside the realm of the designer's
influence, although such things as radio and
intercom systems, which are also hardware items,
have obvious effects on communications. Therefore,
both environmental and liveware concerns are
outside the scope of this paper.
HARDWARE FACTORS OF THE AS332L-1
COCKPIT
Engine Malfunction Warnings
"OVSPD" warning switch/light. To protect
against an engine and rotor overspeed, the fuel
control on the Aerospatiale AS332L-1 Super Puma
is designed to shut down the engine automatically
if the power turbine speed goes too high. Because
the main conditions that can cause a power turbine
overspeed (high speed shaft or free-wheeling unit
failure) happen so quickly, an overspeed warning
light (Fig. 2) is provided so that the pilots realize
the engine has shut itself down due to an
overspeed. This is a good thing to know because
one should normally not re-start an engine if this
happens.
FIGURE 2. "OVSPD" warning switch light.
A relevant point is that the "OVSPD"
light bums steadily when the engine is shut down
normally, but the light flashes when the overspeed
mechanism shuts the engine down.
This creates a human factors problem. Most
pilots have a built-in aversion (although actually
it is a conditioned response) to flashing lights in
the cockpit. Their immediate gut reaction to a
flashing lighted switch is to press the switch to
make it stop blinking. A typical example is the
master caution light in some aircraft. Another
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example is the RACAL Avionics RNAV 1 DECCA
system which flashes a warning light that must be
depressed when there is a problem. There are
certainly many other good examples.
How can a flashing light be a problem?
Consider the following scenario. First, one engine
fails due to an overspeed. The copilot sees the
flashing "OVSPD" light, says nothing, and then,
unconsciously, presses the light to stop it flashing.
Many companies even specify that the first action
during any emergency procedure is to extinguish the
master warning light.
A few minutes later, the captain, who up to
this point has been concentrating on flying the
aircraft, considers trying a restart because he didn't
see the overspeed warning light flashing and the
light is now steady. The copilot, who cancelled the
only indication that would tell them they had an
engine overspeed, readily agrees to a restart
because he cancelled the light without consciously
thinking about it. The engine starts normally,
because the broken engine-to-MGB shaft has no
effect during the starting sequence, but as the pilots
increase power, the unburdened power turbine and
its broken shaft spin faster and faster until
something else breaks. Although this has never
happened in flight, there is one instance of a Super
Puma engine being re-started by a mechanic on the
ground after the engine had shut down due to an
overspeed. The aircraft caught fire and was
destroyed. 2
Three lessons can be learned from this
example. First. flashing warning lights should
only be used for the most serious of malfunctions.
Too many flashing lights in a cockpit defeats their
purpose, which is to catch the pilots' attention and
alert them to a particular problem.
Second. it should only be possible to
extinguish a flashing warning iight by taking the
proper corrective action and removing the hazard.
For example, a flashing fire warning light should
only go out when the fire itself has been
extinguished.
T_ird. extreme care must be used when
designing a switch to function as both a switch and
If the light in a switch does more
than simply indicate whether an item is off or on,
the function of the switch must be easily understood
at all times and under all conditions. One should
not assume that a task people can do under normal
conditions will still be error-free when a panic is
on .3
"POWER" light. Another engine light that causes
problems is the "POWER" light. The "POWER"
light is under the direction of the power calculation
system which is designed to help the pilots
determine which engine is malfunctioning under
various conditions. Very basically, the power
calculation system examines the Ng (gas generator
rpm) readings from both engines and the Nr (rotor
rpm) to determine which engine has malfunctioned
and why; then it illuminates the "POWER 1" or
"POWER 2" light as appropriate.
This is particularly good information to
provide the pilot when the automatic fuel control
of one engine fails and that engine, although still
operating, must be controlled manually. Because
the other engine automatically varies its power
output in order to maintain Nr within limits, it can
be difficult to determine which engine is
malfunctioning.
The problem with the "POWER" lights is
that they don't illuminate until Nr varies
approximately 6-7% above or below the usual in-
flight setting of 100-101%. Although these Nr
values are neither dangerously high nor low, they
are well outside the "usual" Nr values.
Notice the use of the word "usual" and not
"normal." After one hundred or so hours in any
aircraft, most pilots know what the "usual" values
are for pressures, temperatures, rpm, etc. As a
result, they become suspicious when they see
"unusual" values, even if these values are within
the specified "normal" limits. When a helicopter
pilot observes an "unusually" high or low Nr, his
first reaction is to adjust collective pitch to bring
the Nr back to its "usual" normal value.
What happens when an automatic fuel
control malfunctions and causes the Nr to vary is
that the pilot instinctively adjusts the collective
pitch to bring the Nr back to where it belongs. This
defeats the intention of the power calculator
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system because it cannot illuminate a "POWER"
light unless the Nr is above 107% or below 94%.
The pilot is left to figure out which engine is
malfunctioning by interpreting the Ng and T4
indications; or he can choose to raise or lower the
collective until the Nr changes enough to cause the
power calculator to illuminate a "POWER" light,
an action which many pilots are reluctant to do.
Autopilot System
General. Any pilot who has ever worked with an
advanced autopilot knows that the most frequent
mistakes made by pilots, even after they know how
the system operates, are:
1) pushing the wrong buttons at the right
time,
2) pushing the right buttons at the wrong
time,
3) pushing the right buttons in the wrong
sequence,
4) thinking that an autopilot function is off
when it is on, and
5) thinking that an autopilot function is on
when it is off.
A primary cause of these errors is the
manner by which the autopilot functions are
displayed. Usually, the annunciator lights are
shown on one central autopilot panel, which is
often on the center cockpit console (easy to reach,
but out of sight). Sometimes the annunciators are
duplicated elsewhere in the cockpit, on the panels
in front of the pilots or even on the flight
instruments themselves. For example, airspeed
hold may be displayed on the airspeed indicator,
altitude hold on the barometric or radar altimeter,
localizer and glide slope hold on the HSI
(Horizontal Situation Indicator) or artificial
horizon (ADI).
Of the three methods, indicating autopilot
functions on the flight instrumertt@ is the best
v
because this is the method the autopilot
annunciators will be seen most often by the pilot.
The simple reason is that the flight instruments are
an integral part of every experienced pilot's cockpit
scan. The autopilot annunciator panel on the center
console is not a frequent part of most pilots'
instrument cross-check. 4
AS332L-1 autopilot system. The Helikopter
Service AS332L-1 Super Pumas are equipped with
SFIM 155 duplex autopilot systems, SFIM CDV 85
four-axis couplers, Collins ADI-77 Attitude
Direction Indicators, and Astronautics 133640
Horizontal Situation Indicators. 5
Mixing boxes from different manufacturers
may not always be desirable, but due to economic
reasons (mixing may be less expensive), operational
considerations (one system may not provide all
things to all operators), and marketing aspects
(compatibility of systems means greater potential
sales), mixing systems is not going to go away. Asa
consequence, designers of the various components
have tO pay even more attention to human factor
problems and. equally impQltant, there must be
someone in the loot) who is able to examine the
resulting system in its entirety.
With respect to the autopilots in
Helikopter Service's Super Pumas, when they work
as designed, the autopilots are truly impressive. If
there is a malfunction, there are, for the most part,
sufficient back-ups and warnings for the pilot. In
other words, the autopilot hardware, per se, is
generally very good.
However, of all the systems in the Super
Puma, it is universally agreed in Helikopter
Service that the autopilot is the most difficult for
pilots to master. Many of the difficulties with the
autopilot stem from human factor problems in the
design of the system.
Single- or dual-pilot system? The most basic
problem with the system is that it can not be fully
operated from the left seat. Certain functions, for
example coupled ILS and coupled vertical speed,
can only be controlled by the pilot in the right seat.
The system favors the captain's side of the cockpit
to the detriment of the copilot's side.
The reason was Aerospatiale's original
intention to obtain single-pilot IFR certification for
the Super Puma. This has not been obtained and
may never be, but the result is an autopilot system
that makes it difficult or impossible to set up,
among other things, a coupled ILS approach from
the left seat.
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Why is this lack of full dual-pilot
capability not good? Consider this scenario: The
captain becomes incapacitated, the weather at the
airport is at minima, and the copilot is young and
inexperienced. He needs all the help he can get,
but because he can't reach the necessary switches on
the right side of the cockpit, he has to fly the ILS
uncoupled.
A good general principle to use when
desimling autopilot and coupler systems is to make
all autopflot functions fully controllable from both
seats in the cockpit. There should also be one
switch, easily accessible to both pilots, that passes
autopilot authority from left to right and back
again. And there must be a well-defined
annunciator prominently located on the front panel
(the best place would be right on the artificial
horizon) telling the pilots who has the authority.
With respect to single-pilot IFR, the
following policy statement from the International
Federation of Air Line Pilot Associations (IFALPA)
is appropriate:
"Although IFALPA recognizes that presently
single-pilot commercial operations are in
widespread use, this type of operation is not
acceptable during international public
transport flights, including all off-shore
flights, because of the reduced level of safety."
Single-pilot IFR capability is great, but it should
be available to both captain and copilot alike.
Heading select switch. The Helikopter Service
machines have a switch which is used to transfer
autopilot authority between the pilot and copilot,
however it only controls the heading select
function of the system (Fig. 3). Both pilots have a
selected heading index, or heading "bug," on their
horizontal situation indicator (HSI) which is used
to set a desired heading the autopilot coupler
should maintain. The heading select switch tells
the autopilot which heading index to follow.
|
FIGURE 3. Heading select switch.
The idea is simple enough and easy to
understand, but the switch and its associated
annunciator lights indicating which pilot has
heading authority are located on the pedestal
console between the pilots, far away from the HSIs
and other primary flight instruments. The error,
which happens frequently, is that one pilot sets his
heading index to the desired heading and,
forgetting to check the heading select switch,
engages the coupler heading hold. If the switch is
still set to the other pilot and his heading index is
set at another heading, the autopilot will
obviously turn the helicopter to an undesired
heading.
This problem could have been avoided by
putting the annunciator lights for the heading
select switch on the heading indices of the HSIs.
When the pilot has heading control, his index is
illuminated (or some other way highlighted);
when the copilot has heading control, his heading
index is highlighted..
Localizer and glide slope capture modes. The
problem with these modes is deceptively small, yet
potentially extremely dangerous. The "fix" is
probably relatively simple, given the complexities
of the rest of the autopilot system.
An Instrument Landing System (ILS)
provides precision guidance to a runway while
providing very specific obstruction clearances
throughout the approach. By regulation and
common sense, an aircraft is not allowed to descend
on the glide path until it is established on the
localizer course.
With the SFIM CDV 85 four-axis coupler,
it is possible to arm both the localizer and glide
slope modes before being established on either one.
This makes sense because the pilots can set up the
autopilot before they reach the Iocalizer. What
doesn't make sense is that it is possible to capture
the glide slope before the localizer is captured,
and, in fact, even with the localizer mode un-
armed. As a result, the aircraft will descend on the
glide slope beam while outside the limits of the
localizer, which means that the aircraft could be
descending below the minimum altitudes
designated for that part of the approach.
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Coupler and flight director annunciation. Human
factor specialists have often observed that people
adapt well to design deficiencies in their working
environment. One way Super Puma pilots have
adapted to the poor annunciation of the coupler
functions is to use the flight director command bars
(Fig. 4, #2 & 6) on the ADI as an indication to them
that the coupler is on. With the command bars
fight on the instrument they look at most often, the
presence of the bars is not hard to overlook. The
pilots simply make it a personal habit to always
engage the flight director whenever they engage
the coupler.
I '/1 t
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FIGURE 4. Attitude Deviation Indicator
This practice does, however, have one big
disadvantage. If the autopilot disengages, due to a
malfunction, on purpose, or inadvertently (and it is
disengaged inadvertently from time to time), the
coupler drops out, but not the flight director. This
makes sense because it is useful to have flight
direction when the autopilot is out. The problem
occurs when the autopilot is switched back on.
It is not difficult to know when the
autopilot disengages: one feels the difference in the
cyclic at once. The non-flying pilot usually notices
the change in the stability of the flight, as well,
and if he is alert, he reaches down and re-engages
the autopilot within seconds. Both pilots breathe
a sigh of relieL
Unfortunately, their problems are not over.
For although the autopilot is back on and the
flight director command bars are still in view on
the ADIs, the coupler is not engaged. The only
indication that tells the pilots the green coupler
function lights are sending signals to the flight
director only and not to the autopilot, is a small,
dimly-lit "F/D" light tucked away above the
ADIs.
It usually takes some time and perhaps
large heading or altitude deviations before the
pilots discover that the autopilot coupler functions
are not flying the helicopter for them. If this
happens during a critical phase of flight, such as
during an instrument approach to an oil rig at night,
the consequences could be tragic.
"CPL" warning light. Whenever a coupler function
fails or _ the "CPL" light on the master
annunciator panel and the master "WARN" lights
illuminate. Pilots like to have warnings when
something fails, but to receive a warning every time
something is purposely switched off is counter-
productive.
The human factor reason is so obvious that
it is difficult to understand how it was overlooked:
If a warning light comes on numerous times during
every, flight.eventually it will be ignored.
The first time a pilot new to the Super
Puma switches off a coupler hold function he
immediately notices the "CPL" and "WARN"
lights illuminating, and, being new to the machine,
he logically assumes something has failed.
However, by his third or fourth flight, he is
already ignoring the "CPL" light or canceling it
without thought.
The story about the boy who cried "Wolf!"
is a good lesson in human nature which was
apparently forgotten when the SFIM designers
were working on this part of the CDV 85 four-axis
coupler.
Navigation Equipment
NAV-HSI switching panel. Another very
confusing part of the Super Puma is the navigation
switching panel (FIG. 5). Basically, each pilot
has two pointers on the HSI, and he has switches
by which he can choose which navigation radios
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he wants to monitor. There is also a switch that
controls the Course Direction Indicator (CDI)
which accepts signals from VOR 1 or VOR 2.
However, there is an inflexibility in the system in
that the autopilot will accept coupled ILS signals
only from VOR 2 and only when the right-seat
pilot has selected VOR 2 on his CDI and only when
the heading select switch is set to "PILOT." This
automatically, restricts the pilots' choices if they
want to fly a coupled ILS.
_aRz -_ z-_-_ II
FIGURE 5. NAV-HSI switching panel
The number I (green) pointer on both pilots'
HSIs takes signals from either VOR 1 or the ADF
(or ADF 1 if two are installed). The number 2
(orange) pointer takes signals from VOR 2 and the
ADF (or ADF 2 if two are installed).
The confusion occurs because BOTH pointers
can indicate either VORs or ADFs and it is common
to use beth a VOR and an ADF during many VOR
and ILS approaches. What can easily happen is
that the copilot has the ADF on pointer 1 and the
VOR on pointer 2 and the pilot has the opposite
indications.
A better system, given the limitations of
only two pointers, would be to designate one pointer
as the VOR pointer and the other pointer as the
ADF pointer, with a switch to reverse these
functions in case of a pointer failure. That way
both pilots would always know that they have
VOR information on the green pointer, for example,
and ADF information on the orange pointer. To
remove the question of which VOR or ADF is being
monitored, the pointers themselves could display a
"1" or "2/' indicating, respectively, VOR 1 or VOR
2 on the VOR pointer and ADF 1 or ADF 2 on the
ADF pointer. The navigation pointers incorporated
in many EFIS installations the author has seen are
labelled in this manner.
One could monitor two VORs on the same
HSI by switching the CDI to one VOR and the VOR
pointer to the other. It would not be possible to
monitor two ADFs simultaneously on one HSI, but
this is a relatively infrequent requirement. (The
Helikopter Service Super Pumas are only equipped
with one ADF anyway.) If there is a requirement
to monitor two ADFs, the pilot could monitor one
and the copilot the other, or, as an alternative,
either pilot could switch between ADF 1 and ADF 2
every few minutes to check the relative bearings to
the NDB stations.
DME selection. It is possible to monitor one of six
different DME stations depending on how the
switches are set. However, the only indication of
which VOR frequency is giving the DME reading is
by the position of the switch and a light on the
radio itself. The light indicates that the DME is
coming from that box (number one or two), but it
could be from one of three possible frequencies, one
of which may not be displayed, depending on the
position of the HOLD switch.
This can and does create so much confusion
that Helikopter Service instructors recommend
setting the DME function switch to VOR 2 (because
this is the only VOR that can be used to fly a
coupled ILS approach ) and just leaving it there all
the time, except in those rare cases when DME
information from a second VOR is required. The
problem is that there are just too many choices --
too many frequencies from which one can receive
DME information. In the heat of an approach or a
missed approach, it's easy to forget which DME one
is monitoring.
Radio frequency selection. This is a generic problem
to many aircraft, not just the Super Puma. Many
operators do not have 100% standardized fleets. In
fact, there are probably very few operators that
have the same radios in all their aircraft. This is
obviously a matter of economics that pilots just
have to live with.
With most radios, the frequency selected
increases when one rotates the knobs clockwise, but
on a few the frequencies increase when the knobs
are turned counter-clockwise. Some radios allow
one to rotate the knob past the highest useable
frequency and continue turning to the lowest
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frequency on the scale, and vice verse. Others stop
at the highest and lowest frequencies, making it
necessary to turn the knob back the other way. Most
two-tiered knobs (like wedding cakes) work so that
the lower, bigger knob adjusts the numbers in the
left window (therefore the higher numbers) and
the higher, smaller knob adjusts the numbers in the
right window (therefore the lower numbers); other
radios work just the opposite.
It goes without saying that pilots are going
to have trouble tuning frequencies when they have
to use different radio sets. This may seem like a
relatively small thing, and most of the time it is,
but it can be a time-waster. In the worst case a pilot
may accidently set the wrong frequency, not have
time to check the windows, and miss a critical
radio call. Standardizing how frequencies are
dialed in will eliminate one area in the cockpit
that is prone to mistakes.
Landing Lights
When the search light switch in the Super
Puma is pushed down, the search light moves up.
When the switch is pushed up, the search light
troves down.
This is exactly opposite from the way the
moveable search light in the S-61 and Bell 212
work and since all Helikopter Service pilots flew
one or both of these helicopters before transitioning
to the Super Puma, it's no wonder that this causes
difficulty.
Most of the time landing lights are not
needed until short final when they need to be
positioned quickly and accurately. When the light
moves in the opposite direction from what is
expected, it's not only irritating, but potentially
dangerous as well.
As a rule. moveable landing and search
limhts should move up when the switch is pushed
up and move down when the switch is pushed down.
Intercom Switching
The pilot's and co-pilot's intercom switches
are two-position switches, "NORM" and "EMER".
In the normal position, the voice-actuated system
works, which is an extremely good system to use.
The emergency position is there in case the normal
power supply to the system is lost. When in
"EMER," the pilots have to key the microphone
switches on the cyclics or the intercom control panel
in order to talk to each other.
The intercom system would be better if the
need to switch to "EMER" in case of a normal supply
failure were eliminated. In other words, once the
pilots discover that the voice-actuated system no
longer works, all they have to do is use the cyclic or
panel microphone switches.
Trouble-shooting an electrical fire is one
emergency when the emergency intercom system is
needed. Various electrical suppliers must be
switched off, including the normal power supply to
the intercom and the autopilot. One pilot must
therefore concentrate exclusively on flying while
the other pilot is trying to isolate the fire. This is
no time for communication difficulties. Requiring
both pilots to switch to "EMER" just adds an
additional burden and stress factor to the
emergency.
SOFTWARE FACTORS OF THE AS332L-1
COCKPIT
General
As noted before, software factors include
many items, all of them concerned with
information. Often, good, well-designed operating
procedures and checklists can make up for design
faults in the aircraft. For example, with reference
to the flashing "OVSPD" light problem,
Helikopter Service has a prominent note in the
company Emergency Checklist under "Engine
Malfunctions," stating that a failed engine should
not be re-started if the "OVSPD" light is flashing.
It is not the intention of this paper to try to
examine the flight manual, operating procedures,
and all other information sources about the Super
Puma, but rather to limit the discussion to the
information presented to the pilot in the cockpit. In
the author's opinion, the "AS332L-1 Super Puma
Instruction Manual" is is very well written.
However, there are two main problems with the
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manual, which also apply to the cockpit
indications. The first is the occasional
inconsistency among terms and the second is
occasional poor translations from French to English,
including abbreviations. These two problems are
probably related in many instances. 6
An example of the first is the use of both
"generator" and "alternator" to describe the same
thing in the electrical system. Examples of the
second type of problems, translations and
abbreviations, are discussed below.
"MGB COOL" Warning Light
The Super Puma main gear box has two
lubrication pumps, a normal one and an emergency
one. Both pumps are essentially the same and both
run continuously. The main differences are (1) the
main pump delivers a slightly higher pressure, (2)
the input to the emergency pump is positioned
below the input to main pump, and (3) the
emergency pump system bypasses the transmission
oil cooler.
If the main pump stops delivering oil,
either due to a leak in the system or failure of the
pump itself, the emergency pump will continue to
supply oil to the main gear box. The emergency
pump bypasses the transmission oil cooler because a
leak in the system will most likely be in the
plumbing to the oil cooler. The emergency pump
lubricates everything in the main gear box, but the
oil is no longer cooled. As a consequence, one can
expect a gradual rise in transmission oil
temperature with a failure of the main pump or a
leak.
It's obviously important to warn the pilot
that this has happened and the "MGB COOL"
light (Fig. 6, #6) serves this function. It is triggered
by a pressure switch which senses the drop in
pressure in the line downstream of the oil cooler.
The theory is very good and the light
works in practice, but the language on the light
creates confusion. "MGB COOL" does not mean that
the MGB is now cool or will become cool. Quite to
the contrary, the oil will now become hotter. Nor
A
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FIGURE 6. Main gear box lubrication system.
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does the light mean that the MGB cooler has
failed. If the cooler fails, due to a broken drive
shaft or shattered fan blades (both of which have
happened a number of times), the "MGB COOL"
light does not illuminate; what one sees is a rise in
MGB temperature and, eventually, a "MGB TEMP"
warning light. "MGB COOL" means that the MGB
cooler has been _. This is not, however, the
most important thing the pilot needs to know at
this point, even if he does remember what the light
signifies.
The important thing is that the main pump
is no longer delivering oil to the system, either
because of a failure or a leakage. Therefore, it
would seem to make more sense for the light to be
labelled so that it better conveys this information,
for example, "MGB PUMP." The point is: The
wording used on warning lights must be carefully
chosen so that the most critical factor of a given
malfunction is immediately comprehended.
Hydraulic Panel
The labelling on the hydraulic panel is
particularly confusing, even to pilots who have
flown the Super Puma for many years (Fig. 7A &
713). The problem is that the abbreviations are not
consistent and this was a result of translating
abbreviations from French to English.
On some of the switches, the letter "H"
stands for "hand" and on others it stands for
"hydraulic." On many of the switches, "H" could
stand for either "hand" or "hydraulic." On one
switch, "H" stands for both "hand" and
"hydraulic."
The correct meanings are as follows:
LH.P - LEFT HAND PRESSURE (low)
LH.LEV = LEFT HAND LEVEL (low)
LH.H.MP = LEFT HAND HYDRAULIC
MAIN PUMP (failure)
A P.H.P = AUTOPILOT HYDRAULIC
PRESSURE 0ow)
AUX.HP = AUXILIARY HYDRAULIC
PRESSURE (low)
AUX.P = AUXILIARY PUMP (failure)
AUX.P = AUXILIARY PUMP (on/off switch)
RH.P = RIGHT HAND PRESSURE (low)
RH.LEV = RIGHT HAND LEVEL (low)
FIGURE 7A. Hydraulic panel with French
abbreviations.
The culprits on the English switches are
the letters "P" and "H." On some of the switches,
the letter "P" stands for "pump" and on other
switches it stands for "pressure." On every switch
"P" appears, it could logically stand for either
"pump" or "pressure."
FIGURE 7B. Hydraulic panel with English
abbreviations.
It's easy to understand how this creates
confusion. Anything that does this, particularly
during an emergency, is going to increase the stress
level and the chances for mistakes. The lesson is
obvious: Make all abbreviations readily
understandable and consistent.
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'q'I-IROT" Light
This light indicates that one or both of the
fuel flow control levers (FFCL) is not in the
"FLIGHT' position, where they normally should be
if they are working normally. It's a useful light
with an engine failure and subsequent shut-down
because it is the only warning light that remains
illuminated after the FFCL has been set in the
shut-off position. (The "DIFF NG" and "PRESS 1"
or "PRESS 2" lights extinguish when the FFCL is in
the shut-off position.)
But why is it called the "THROT" light,
and not, for example, the "FFCL" light? The term
"throttle" is not used anywhere in the Instruction
Manual or the Flight Manual. The proper term is
"Fuel Flow Control Lever." The use of the word
"throttle" and its abbreviation "THROT" is,
perhaps, either a carry-over from the days when
most helicopters had reciprocating engines and,
therefore, throttles (admittedly, some still do) or
perhaps it's just another translation problem from
French to English.
The point is: Consistency. ]ItlIXL__aO_U_
always be referred to by the same correct name.
both in the flia_ht manual and in the cockpit.
Autopilot Panel
The hardware aspects of the autopilot
were discussed previously. The software aspects of
the panel are actually quite good, with only a few
minor exceptions.
To test the basic autopilot system, one
moves the test switch from "TEST" to "RUN,"
meaning, apparently, that one is "running the test."
On the other hand, to test the collective
part of the autopilot (the fourth-axis), one moves
the test switch from "NORMAL" to "TEST."
Again, it's a small point, but one that is
easily corrected.
"RB. SAFE" and "ROT.BR" Lights
The Super Puma has a two-lever rotor
brake system with a rotor brake safe lever and a
rotor brake lever. It is possible to move the rotor
brake lever to the braking position in flight (which
obviously should not be done), but it will do nothing
more than cause the "ROT.BR" light to illuminate
(Fig. 8). Hydraulic pressure to the rotor brake is
obtained only when both levers are pushed
forward, a sensible system which just about
guarantees that the rotor brake won't be engaged
inadvertently at the wrong time.
FIGURE 8. "RB. SAFE" AND "ROT.BR" lights
"RB. SAFE" means that the rotor brake
safety lever is in the forward position, not, as one
may be lead to suspect, that the rotor brake is safe.
Actually, one could argue that with the safety
lever in the forward position, the rotor brake
system is unsafe because, now, if the rotor brake
lever is moved forward, braking pressure will be
applied to the rotor system. In effect, moving the
rotor brake safety lever forward arms the rotor
brake system.
So why not label the "RB. SAFE" light "RB
ARM?" One could also change the "ROT.BR"
light to "RB ON" to make the abbreviation of
"rotor brake" consistent.
Heater Distributor Valve Control
The heater has a three-position distributor
valve control lever so that the pilots can choose
where they want the heat directed. In the forward
position, the heat is divided between the cockpit
and the autopilot; in the middle position, heat goes
to the cockpit, the autopilot, and the cabin; in the
aft position, all heat distribution to the aircraft is
cut off. The problem with the heater lies in the
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fact that the distributor valve control lever has
been poorly labelled.
The forward position is labelled
"COCKPIT POSTE PILOTE." This looks like a
blending of English and French -- it probably means
the cockpit will be heated. But it says nothing
about the autopilot which is also heated.
The middle position is labelled "O." A
person who knows a little French might conclude
that "O" is an abbreviation for "ouvert" which
means "open." But what is being heated with the
switch open? There's no way to determine this from
the labelling of the switch. On the other hand, a
person who knows no French might think the "0"
(oh) is a "0" (zero) and that it means the heater is
off or closed.
The aft position is labelled vertically "F
C." Again, a French speaker might assume the "F'
stands for "fermi" which means "closed" and the
"C" might be an English abbreviation for "closed."
Then again, both letters could be either French
abbreviations or English abbreviations. It's very
hard to tell.
This may seem like a small thing again;
after all, it's only the heater switch. But it is also
confusing, annoying, and totally unnecessary. With
only a bit more thought and effort, the lever could
have been labelled so that the function of the three
positions were obvious.
SPURIOUS WARNINGS
As was mentioned before concerning the
"CPL" light illuminating every time a coupler
function is switched off, continuous unnecessary
warnings eventually are ignored. Complacency
with respect to the warning is the result. In some
aircraft, pilots have gone so far as to pull circuit
breakers for certain specific warning lights because
they were so prone to false warnings. MGB chip
warning lights are notorious examples.
Sophisticated electronic systems seem to be
all too prone to spurious warnings. The numerous
landing gear position switches in the Super Puma
are particularly sensitive, and if it weren't for the
aircraft's emergency electrical and hydraulic
extension possibilities, there would be a lot of gear-
up landings at Helikopter Service. These switches
are not, however, just a problem for the landing
gear, but also for all the auxiliary equipment
which receive "GROUND" or "FLIGHT" signals
from these same switches.
For example, a common problem with the
Super Puma is for the area navigation system (be it
VLF/OMEGA, DECCA, LORAN, or whatever) to
"freeze up" in flight. The solution is to re-cycle the
landing gear. The cause is the loss of the "FLIGHT'
signal to the area nav system because one of the
landing gear has moved out of position far enough
to open a switch which should have been closed.
Another related problem concerns the
autopilot. Once the author found it impossible to
run the autopilot test, even though the switch was
moved from "TEST" to "RUN" several times. All
the functions worked, but the test just wouldn't run.
A mechanic was notified and he immediately
realized the problem was a position switch in the
nose gear. He grabbed a tow bar, jiggled the nose
wheel, and the autopilot test worked as designed.
Incorrect fire warning system tests during
start-up are another headache. Mechanics have
changed system control cards, wiring harnesses, and
fire detectors, but usually the problem is simply
moisture. Most of the time the system will test
properly after the engines are started and
everything is allowed to warm up and dry out.
The point is that pilots quickly loose faith
in a warning system if it continually gives false
warnings. When a warning system cries "Wolf!"
all the time when there is no wolf, the one time
there really is a wolf at the door, it may be
ignored. The increased use of electronics and
computers in helicopters promises numerous
advantages for the pilots, but the systems must be
constructed so that they are not adversely affected
by the environment.
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FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS
"New technologies incorporating multiple
redundancy and fail-safe concepts are becoming so
reliable that, in future years, the proportion of
human factor accidents may reach 100 percent
simply because the total, irrecoverable failure of
machine components of the man-aircraft system
will be eliminated."
Dr. Robert B. Lee
Australian Bureau of Air Safety
Investigation 7
"The Space Invader-playing kids of today will be
the fighter and bomber pilots of tomorrow."
Ronald Reagan
40th President of the United States
Even though former President Reagan
didn't mention helicopter pilots in the above quote,
they certainly must be included. What is just as
certain is that his prediction is already coming
true.
How will this effect human factor problems
in the cockpit?
Not more than ten or fifteen years ago, the
space and aircraft industries were the epitome of
high-tech. In many ways, they still are, but since
the advent of inexpensive micro-chips, "smart"
machines are now commonplace in most homes.
Today, the gap between sophisticated aircraft and
sophisticated household machines has narrowed.
Entire houses can now be controlled by a central
computer. In late 1988, the Electronic Industries
Association/Consumer Electronics Group announced
a new wiring standard called the Consumer
Electronics Bus which will enable microprocessor-
equipped appliances built by one company to
communicate with those built by another. 8
This means that more and more people will
use sophisticated electronic and computer-
controlled devices on a daily basis. Today, many
children learn to operate machines even before
they can read. 9 At age four, the author's youngest
son knew how to operate the remote controls of a
video cassette recorder and television, find and
play games on a Macintosh computer, use various
cassette players, and heat food in a microwave
oven. Operating machines is second nature to him.
Aircraft designers will have a new human
factor element to consider. Instead of the
automobile, electronic, and other industries
mimicking the designs of equipment found in
aircraft, the aircraft manufacturers may find
themselves copying panel designs from these
industries in order to avoid human factor problems
in the cockpit. This is not to say that aircraft will
loose their place on the cutting edge of technology,
but that aircraft designers will have to be more
aware of the designs of equipment made by other
industries.
For example, affordable, hand-held GPS
systems are now available for less than $1000 from
a number of manufacturers. It won't be long before a
dashboard-mounted GPS becomes a common option
in automobiles and trucks. If the GPS receivers
pilots find in their aircraft are very dissimilar
from these car systems and hand-helds, human
factor errors will occur.
In the past, pilots had to contend with
transfer of learning problems between their
airplanes and their automobiles. 10 These problems
will seem minor to the pilots of future generations
who will have to contend with transfer of learning
problems between their aircraft and their cars,
their computers, their home entertainment systems,
and numerous other gadgets, appliances, and
machines, some of which have yet to be invented.
There will be international "standards"
developed and accepted, sometimes by agreements
and official decrees, but perhaps more often by the
company that is able to sell the most of a particular
product first. If a similar machine does not fit the
accepted "norm" or the standard that people have
become accustomed to, problems will arise.
A human factors problem occurred when
Helikopter Service installed a new security system
in the main office and hanger. Like the old system,
the new one required the use of magnetic-strip
identity cards. The old system required one to
insert the card in the controller and punch in a four-
digit code before the door would open. The new
system required that the code be punched in first,
389
then the card inserted. If the card was inserted
first and then the code punched in, as with the old
system, a red light blinked indicating something
was wrong.
On the first day, hardly anyone could get
into the building. Even though instructions had
been distributed beforehand, few bothered to read
them, assuming wrongly that the new system
worked the same way as the old one. Most people
thought there was something wrong with their
card or their code. The problem was the system
itself; the fault was that of the engineer who had
not realized that a "standard" for card-and-code
door opening systems had already been established
at the company.
There may have to be a radical change in
the way aircraft are designed. In the past, the
machine was foremost. The goal was to make the
machine work and if a switch or lever was in an
awkward position for the pilot, then he just had to
adapt to it. Fortunately, this attitude has changed
a great deal since World War II and aircraft
designers spend much more attention to ergonomic
factors inside the cockpit.
In the future, however, desiimers will also
have to look outside the cockpit, at the numerous
other sophisticated machines that are becoming or
are already commonplace, when considering human
f_mmp.mlaem_
Everything in the cockpit will have to be
considered in this light. From the simplest
mechanical things, such as the way the seats are
adjusted, to the most sophisticated computer-
driven systems. Designers will have to stay up-to-
date with currently accepted standards in the
"outside world." Are computer pull-down menus
and "windows" so widespread that they should be
considered standards to be used in the cockpit?
Should the "QWERTY" keyboard found on
typewriters or the keypad used on touch-tone
telephones be the standard for aircraft navigation
and computer systems? Should the clock be digital
or analog, or both? Should the artificial feel in a
fly-by-wire control stick have the same "feel" as a
Nintendo joystick? These are the kinds of questions
that must be constantly and continually asked.
To help answer questions like these,
manufacturers must establish, promote, and use an
effective feedback system so that ideas and
suggestions from line pilots _ the field can be
obtained on a re_lar basis.
Every successful company believes it is "the
man on the shop floor" who best knows how to do
his job and who has the most useful suggestions
about how to do it better. Good companies solicit
information from every level.
In the author's experience, aviation
companies are often very conservative and many
even have military-like organizations.
Information in military hierarchies goes up and
down the chain of command, although it usually
flows down a lot easier than it goes up. If the chief
pilot or chief of maintenance does not agree with a
line pilot's or mechanic's suggestion, the idea stops
there and never gets to the manufacturer where it
might have been accepted. The only exception is in
the case of an accident. Then people are listened to.
A reporting system connecting line pilots
directly to manufacturers would be an excellent way
to get feedback about present and future cockpits. 11
CONCLUSIONS
The author readily concedes the subjective
nature of this paper. However, given the fact that
the very nature of the applied technology of human
factors presupposes a degree of subjectivity, the
author hopes his departure from the scientific
method will not cause his conclusions to be
summarily disregarded. In lieu of a feedback
system described above, a forum such as this is one
of the few ways a line pilot can make his
observations and opinions known to people who can
make a difference.
1. Flashing warning lights should only be
used for the most serious of malfunctions; taking the
proper corrective action and removing the hazard,
should be the only possible way to extinguish a
flashing warning light.
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2. Extreme care must be used when designing a
switch to function as both a switch and a warning
light. One should not assume that a task people
can do under normal conditions will still be error-
free during an emergency.
3. Autopilot functions should be annunciated
on the flight instrument relevant to each particular
function.
4. All autopilot functions should be fully
controllable from each seat. Single-pilot IFR
is great, but it should be available to
both captain and copilot alike.
5. It should not be possible for the autopilot to
capture the glide slope portion of an instrument
landing system until the localizer is captured.
6. Warning lights that illuminate every time
a minor item, such as an autopilot coupler function,
is switched off have a tendency to be ignored by
pilots after a few hours of experience in the
aircraft.
7. All radio frequency selectors should rotate
the same direction: clockwise to increase frequency;
counter-clockwise to decrease.
8. Moveable landing or search lights should
move up when the switch is moved up and move
down when the switch is moved down.
9. The language used on warning lights and
switches should be consistent with the wording
used in the flight manual, checklists, and other
related material; the wording must be carefully
chosen so that the most critical factor of a given
malfunction is immediately comprehended;
abbreviations should be consistent, logical, and
easily interpreted; translations to other languages
must be very carefully checked for correct meanings.
10. Electronic and computer-based systems must
be constructed so they are not adversely affected by
the environment.
11. Cockpit designers must look outside the
cockpit, at the numerous other sophisticated
machines that are becoming or are already
commonplace, when considering human factors
problems that may occur in the cockpit.
12. Manufacturers should establish, promote,
and use an effective feedback system so that ideas
and suggestions from professional pilots are
obtained on a regular basis.
FINAL THOUGHT
If Dr. Lee's predictions about the proportion
of human factor accidents reaching 100% is right,
then constant awareness of and attention to human
factor problems by everyone involved with the
design and operation of aircraft will be the
way to prevent aircraft accidents in the future.
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